It is no easy thing being Lebanon
It is no easy thing being LebanonBy Frederic C. Hof Commentary by Tuesday, January 30, 2007
Six months after the 2006 summer war, Lebanon is essentially the same place it was six months and (for that matter) 60 years before the war: a non-state entity trying to make a go of confessional coexistence in a very rough neighborhood. While the names of some of the players change along with the relative weights of their respective constituencies, Lebanon's essence remains as it has since 1943, namely a fragment of the Ottoman Empire lacking one key facet: a sultan whose rule and writ extends throughout the country.
For some 15 years (following a 15-year Civil War), Lebanon was under the suzerainty of the president of the Syrian Arab Republic. That sultan was dramatically expelled from Lebanon in the spring of 2005 after having alienated - with a heavy and violent hand - many of his subjects. With the help, however, of some Lebanese loyalists - featuring the party/militia dominating Lebanon's largest (Shiite) sect and a retired Maronite general once known for his hatred of Baathist Syria - the restoration of the Damascus-based sultan seems on track.
In an Arab world where centralized authoritarianism has been the response to the death of empire and departure of Europeans, Lebanon's decentralized confessional "system" (where real power resides in the hands of local, sect-based leaders, some feudal, some more "modern") has actually promoted the trappings of democracy and free press even as it preserves aspects of Ottomanism. Although it has sometimes been touted as "the Arab world's only democracy," Lebanon proved the point long before Iraq that free elections do not a democracy make. While Lebanon has the appearance of a state - Parliament, senior officials, bureaucracy, UN membership and even an army - the state is an illusion and citizenship transcending sect is virtually absent. The "government of Lebanon" is not empowered by the consent of the electorate. Rather, it borrows political power from those who own it once the owners achieve consensus.
Lebanon is not a "failed state." It is a non-state whose peculiar status was on display in July and August 2006. On July 12, Hizbullah - a state within a non-state in South Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley and the southern suburbs of Beirut - exercised sovereign power by violating the Lebanon-Israel "Blue Line" at a spot not at all disputed by the "government of Lebanon." Not content with a "resistance" burlesque in the artificially disputed "Shebaa farms," Hizbullah's leaders plunged Lebanon into 34 days of unspeakable violence from which the organization emerged (owing largely to Israeli incompetence) with an aura of heroism and efficiency in Lebanon and throughout the Arab world.http://www.dailystar.com.lb
Yet Hizbullah's triumph was not unalloyed. To the surprise of all, the non-state's prime minister offered to put 15,000 Lebanese soldiers south of the Litani River, breaking a diplomatic deadlock and creating an expanded UNIFIL. With international and Lebanese forces interposed between Hizbullah fighters and the Lebanon-Israel "Blue Line" - even in the area of the "Shebaa Farms" - how was Hizbullah to "do resistance?" Without armed resistance aimed at "liberating occupied Lebanese territory," on what basis - certainly not the Taif Accord - could Hizbullah retain its arms? And without arms (especially rockets and missiles), how could Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and his leadership cadre fulfill their paramount political-military mission: providing a deterrent capability for the Islamic Republic of Iran? As a respected and trusted colleague of the clerical leadership in Tehran, Nasrallah - while he would fight to the last Lebanese for the sake of the Islamic revolution in Iran - does not deserve to be labeled a "stooge." He is a true believer and a real leader, albeit in and for a cause that is not Lebanese.
In order to restore his deterrent capability and his freedom to pursue "armed resistance," it is essential that Nasrallah neutralize the upstart "government of Lebanon" and ease the return of Syrian suzerainty. Whether or not he and his colleagues sincerely believe that Prime Minister Fouad Siniora welcomed Israel's attacks on Hizbullah, there is no doubt that Siniora's surprise offer to deploy the army was an unwelcome exercise of state-like power. A "government of Lebanon" that blocks an international tribunal for the murderers of Rafik Hariri, gets the army and UNIFIL out of the South and the Syrian sultan back in the saddle will be very much to the liking of Iran and Hizbullah's leadership cadre.
All of this leaves Lebanon as it has always been: a fragile fragment of Ottomanism with no sultan of its own and no citizenship uniting its people. In a region roiled by ongoing Arab-Israel conflict and Iranian assertiveness, it is not easy being Lebanon. Indeed, it will likely get much harder.
Frederic C. Hof is the CEO of AALC, an Arlington, Virginia, international business consulting firm. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.
Six months after the 2006 summer war, Lebanon is essentially the same place it was six months and (for that matter) 60 years before the war: a non-state entity trying to make a go of confessional coexistence in a very rough neighborhood. While the names of some of the players change along with the relative weights of their respective constituencies, Lebanon's essence remains as it has since 1943, namely a fragment of the Ottoman Empire lacking one key facet: a sultan whose rule and writ extends throughout the country.
For some 15 years (following a 15-year Civil War), Lebanon was under the suzerainty of the president of the Syrian Arab Republic. That sultan was dramatically expelled from Lebanon in the spring of 2005 after having alienated - with a heavy and violent hand - many of his subjects. With the help, however, of some Lebanese loyalists - featuring the party/militia dominating Lebanon's largest (Shiite) sect and a retired Maronite general once known for his hatred of Baathist Syria - the restoration of the Damascus-based sultan seems on track.
In an Arab world where centralized authoritarianism has been the response to the death of empire and departure of Europeans, Lebanon's decentralized confessional "system" (where real power resides in the hands of local, sect-based leaders, some feudal, some more "modern") has actually promoted the trappings of democracy and free press even as it preserves aspects of Ottomanism. Although it has sometimes been touted as "the Arab world's only democracy," Lebanon proved the point long before Iraq that free elections do not a democracy make. While Lebanon has the appearance of a state - Parliament, senior officials, bureaucracy, UN membership and even an army - the state is an illusion and citizenship transcending sect is virtually absent. The "government of Lebanon" is not empowered by the consent of the electorate. Rather, it borrows political power from those who own it once the owners achieve consensus.
Lebanon is not a "failed state." It is a non-state whose peculiar status was on display in July and August 2006. On July 12, Hizbullah - a state within a non-state in South Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley and the southern suburbs of Beirut - exercised sovereign power by violating the Lebanon-Israel "Blue Line" at a spot not at all disputed by the "government of Lebanon." Not content with a "resistance" burlesque in the artificially disputed "Shebaa farms," Hizbullah's leaders plunged Lebanon into 34 days of unspeakable violence from which the organization emerged (owing largely to Israeli incompetence) with an aura of heroism and efficiency in Lebanon and throughout the Arab world.http://www.dailystar.com.lb
Yet Hizbullah's triumph was not unalloyed. To the surprise of all, the non-state's prime minister offered to put 15,000 Lebanese soldiers south of the Litani River, breaking a diplomatic deadlock and creating an expanded UNIFIL. With international and Lebanese forces interposed between Hizbullah fighters and the Lebanon-Israel "Blue Line" - even in the area of the "Shebaa Farms" - how was Hizbullah to "do resistance?" Without armed resistance aimed at "liberating occupied Lebanese territory," on what basis - certainly not the Taif Accord - could Hizbullah retain its arms? And without arms (especially rockets and missiles), how could Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and his leadership cadre fulfill their paramount political-military mission: providing a deterrent capability for the Islamic Republic of Iran? As a respected and trusted colleague of the clerical leadership in Tehran, Nasrallah - while he would fight to the last Lebanese for the sake of the Islamic revolution in Iran - does not deserve to be labeled a "stooge." He is a true believer and a real leader, albeit in and for a cause that is not Lebanese.
In order to restore his deterrent capability and his freedom to pursue "armed resistance," it is essential that Nasrallah neutralize the upstart "government of Lebanon" and ease the return of Syrian suzerainty. Whether or not he and his colleagues sincerely believe that Prime Minister Fouad Siniora welcomed Israel's attacks on Hizbullah, there is no doubt that Siniora's surprise offer to deploy the army was an unwelcome exercise of state-like power. A "government of Lebanon" that blocks an international tribunal for the murderers of Rafik Hariri, gets the army and UNIFIL out of the South and the Syrian sultan back in the saddle will be very much to the liking of Iran and Hizbullah's leadership cadre.
All of this leaves Lebanon as it has always been: a fragile fragment of Ottomanism with no sultan of its own and no citizenship uniting its people. In a region roiled by ongoing Arab-Israel conflict and Iranian assertiveness, it is not easy being Lebanon. Indeed, it will likely get much harder.
Frederic C. Hof is the CEO of AALC, an Arlington, Virginia, international business consulting firm. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.
posted by lebanonfirst @ 7:49 AM
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