Will the Lebanonization of Lebanon be too much of an undertaking?

Will the Lebanonization of Lebanon be too much of an undertaking?By Rosana Bou Monsef Wednesday, April 27, 2005
April 26, 2005 was not an ordinary day in the modern history of Lebanon, considering the fact a Syrian troop and intelligence withdrawal was, until yesterday, difficult to imagine, if not impossible to implement.
For the majority of Lebanese - regardless of confession or political affiliation - the suggestion they might live to witness the evacuation of the Syrian Army, as they had witnessed its invasion almost 30 years ago, was preposterous.
Nor did political observers entertain hope of such a withdrawal, even after the passing in September 2004 of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 one day before the extension of President Emile Lahoud's term.
The resolution was meant to be considered by Lebanon and the international community as a call for the fulfilment of a state's right to recover its sovereignty, independence and freedom to make its own decisions.
But, like so many preceding resolutions, its implementation was delayed until the proper timing of local developments, according to political and diplomatic information made available in the first four months that followed its endorsement.
Although Lebanon's right to true independence was acknowledged internationally several years after the initial Syrian presence, observers believed the implementation of resolutions 242 and 338 to be examples of how long it would take until 1559 in actuality came into effect.
In other words, no one thought Resolution 1559 would be implemented before at least a few years
had passed.
Of all Lebanese politicians and delegation leaders, only former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and a select few others believed the countdown for a full Syrian withdrawal had truly been set in motion by Resolution 1559.
His answer was clear during our final meeting before his assassination, the backlash from which is viewed by many observers as the real force behind the pullout of Syrian military and intelligence troop from Lebanon.
When asked whether Lebanon had earned the right to sovereignty and the freedom to make its own decisions, Hariri had said "Not yet," stressing the importance of taking into consideration various developments.
Exiled former Army Commander General Michel Aoun was the other party who was absolutely confident about an inevitable Syrian withdrawal before the end of this year, if not sooner.
The Lebanese are ecstatic over the Syrian pullout, in particular about the fact it was done quickly and quietly immediately following a speech in front of the Syrian Parliament by President Bashar Assad on March 5, 2005.
Most Lebanese even managed to keep quiet over reservations with parts of Assad's speech so as to not undermine bilateral relations between the two countries, believing Damascus will still control major aspects of Lebanon's political arena even after the withdrawal.
Their restraint is based on Syria and Lebanon's geographic proximity and a true desire to bridge the gap between the Lebanese opposition and loyalty in the hopes of preserving Lebanon's stability and future.
But, other observers believe the desire of the international community to confirm the completion of the Syrian withdrawal will eventually exempt Syria from further pressures regarding any continued political influence.
Even this would be a step in the right direction as it would at least deprive
Syrian troops from "the brotherly salvation" which has marked their presence in Lebanon for the past
29 years.
This would also identify Syrian troops within the real framework of foreign troops that were present on Lebanese soil and which had helped Lebanon at times, but for a very steep price - total control over the country.
The erection of statues of the late Syrian President Hafez Assad and his sons Bassel and Bashar in various towns and villages across the country is not the only example of such domination.
Another example is the substantial alteration of the political, geographic and legal composition of the Lebanese regime, which was so thorough that the Lebanonization of Lebanon may be too much of an undertaking, thus scaring off many Lebanese abroad who had planned to return.
The Lebanese are well aware the Syrian withdrawal would not have been
possible without international support, Resolution 1559 and the strenuous follow-up of the United States and Europe.
The Lebanese are also hoping to take advantage of the current mountain of international support to push Syria for recognition of Lebanon's independence by establishing normal diplomatic posts in the two countries, thereby reducing the probability of a return to the past in the event such international support should dry up.
The re-Lebanonization of the country started with the ousting of the pro-Syrian satellites here, particularly the resignation of the high-ranking security officials used by Syria to consolidate its influence in Lebanon during near 30 years of hegemony.
The upcoming parliamentary elections will be the next move in this direction, but the tide of change must not end there.