Friday, June 22, 2007

Say 'Yes' to Damascus, Ramallah

Say 'Yes' to Damascus, Ramallah

Israel should engage in negotiations with both Syria and Palestinians
Shaul Arieli
http://www.ynetnews.com/Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrintPreview/1,2506,L-3410460,00.html

The prime minister's somewhat forced willingness to embark on negotiations with Syria is commensurate with an estimate recently being presented by moderate, Fatah-supporting Palestinian intellectuals. They believe, surprisingly so and in contradiction to the common Palestinian position, that today, in the absence of solid Israeli leadership and genuine ability by Fatah to take the reins legitimately from Hamas, the conflict between the sides may continue and even escalate, so this period should be utilized in order to engage in Israeli-Syrian talks.

Such talks, according to this estimate, would contain positive stimulators that would serve to renew future talks between Israel and the Palestinians.

This position is premised on, among other things, the enduring estimation that no government in Israel is able to drum up public support for concessions and evacuations in two parallel tracks, and therefore, for the sake of regional stability and final-status agreements, it is better to invest efforts in the track that has the best chances to succeed at any given time.

According to this perception, the Syrian channel may enable the United States to stabilize the situation in Iraq and boost its chances to pull out soon. It can also serve to strengthen the group of moderate Arab countries, which are threatened by Iran's growing rise, while reducing the threat faced by Israel.

An Israeli-Syrian agreement would very soon after lead to a deal with Lebanon, while significantly weakening Hizbullah's capabilities to threaten Israel's northern border and support Hamas.

The weakening of radical Islamic forces would force Hamas to soften its positions, embark on the path of negotiations, and recognize Israel, or alternately, Fatah would be able to replace Hamas should the former find the strength required for rehabilitation.

However, choosing the Syrian channel ignores the threats inherent in the absence of a meaningful diplomatic process on the Palestinian track. Under current circumstances, Hamas enjoys a constant boost in its strength vis-Ã -vis Fatah and in terms of control over the Gaza Strip.

In the absence of a diplomatic change, Israel's chances of finding Palestinians leaders willing to sign a final-status agreement will increasingly fade over time. Maintaining a policy that rejects a Hamas-led Palestinian government or one that includes Hamas could quickly bring about the Palestinian Authority's collapse and dismantlement.

Such development would again find Israel responsible for the Palestinian fate, which it has already been able to shake off in the framework of the Oslo agreements. Such move would also eliminate any possible "return address" that would be able to manage the daily relationship with Israel – and even more so, one that would be able to handle negotiations and the implementation of an agreement.

Major international contribution needed

Such chaos may bring about, in a best-case scenario, intensive and effective international intervention, yet it would more likely enable any radical organization, such as al-Qaeda, to get a foothold on the ground and threaten Israel.

Finally, such bloody conflict would serve Iran as a platform for its threats on Israel and for the Iranian strengthening process.

This cautious estimate may lead us to the conclusion that the current and particularly future government of Israel must actually proceed on both tracks and even add the Lebanese channel, which does not require any significant concessions.

There is strong Arab involvement and attachment to the problem of Palestinian refugees. Lebanon would not rush to sign a final-status deal before the future of Palestinian refugees in its territory id determined.

The Arab and Muslim world, which are concerned about the fate of Temple Mount (al-Haram al-Sharif, as they call it) would not be quick to allow the Palestinians to sign agreements that are not coordinated with Arab countries.

The question of boundaries and the 1967 borders are relevant for these three partners, which are limited and threatened by the prospect of creating a precedent different than the agreement with Egypt, and the principle of border adjustments based on the Jordanian model may serve as a common denominator.
The process of normalization also refer to regional aspects of transportation, tourism, ecology, water, and more, and therefore require cooperation in order to formulate a coordinated regional plan for Israel's various borders.
All agreements require deep and resource-rich international involvement for the sake of absorbing refugees and settlers, IDF redeployment, the establishment of two capitals in Jerusalem, and advancing the Palestinian and Syrian economy, among other things.

The ability to enlist support and organize this in a gradual manner within an international community fed up with failure is more difficult than focusing an effort to advance a comprehensive regional solution.
Israel has already been presented with the platform of and "umbrella" for such move – both in the form of the Arab League Initiative and the international conference that would accompany the second phase of the Road Map plan.
The abovementioned are not free of difficulties or risks, yet on the other hand, changing the thinking pattern regarding one-track negotiations (which are also not quite seriously adopted in Jerusalem at this time) could bring about a significant change in Israel's chances to enjoy stability, security, and integration into the region.

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